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Culture is a meritocracy: Why ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐŵĂǇƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƐŽĐŝĂůŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ 
Abstract 
The attitudes and values of cultural and creative workers are an important element of explaining 
current academic interest in inequality and culture. To date, quantitative approaches to this 
element of cultural and creative inequality has been overlooked, particularly in British research. 
This paper investigates the attitudes of those working in creative jobs with a unique dataset, a web 
survey of creative ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ?ŶA䄃? ? ? ? ? ?Using principal components analysis and regression, 
we have three main findings. First, in contrast to Richard Florida's thesis on the attitudes and values 
ŽĨ ?ƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞĐůĂƐƐ ? ?ŽƵƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ? attitudes were no more meritocratic than those of the 
general population. Second, those with the strongest belief in meritocracy in the sector are those in 
the most privileged positions, specifically those are best-rewarded by the sector. Third, our 
research provides support for existing qualitative research on attitudes in the cultural sector, in 
which the worst-rewarded workers are most aware of structural inequality. We conclude that the 
attitudes held by creative workers, and who holds which attitudes, make it unlikely that access to 
the sector and trajectories of individual progression within the sector will change. These findings 
also have important implications for current public interest in whether access to creative work is 
limited to those from privileged backgrounds. 
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 ?/ĂŵŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇƚŚĂƚ/ǁŝƐŚƚŽŬĞĞƉ ?ĞǀĞƌƐŝŶĐĞ/ǁĂƐǇŽƵŶŐ ?I wanted to be with people 
who left race and religion and age and gender and shoe size and things outside the door when 
ƚŚĞǇĐĂŵĞ ?WĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽĂƌĞŝŶŽƵƌƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŚŽƐĞĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽďĞ
with those people. I wanted to be, I wanted to hang out with the boys in the band, I wanted to 
ďĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƐŝƐƚĞƌŚŽŽĚ ? Joanna Lumley  
1: Introduction  
 2 
Speaking on reception of her BAFTA Fellowship, at the 2017 BAFTA Television awards, the well-
known actor Joanna Lumley sought to capture what she felt were the best qualities of her 
ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?ĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐŚĞƌĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽďĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌĞĂƚĐŝƌĐƵƐ ? ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĨĞůůŽǁƐŚŝƉ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ
cultural sector, Ms Lumley painted a picture of co-operation across the various roles and 
occupations producing culture, and a shared sense of openness and anti-discrimination. As this 
paper demonstrates, this is a picture shared by many cultural workers. >ƵŵůĞǇ ?Ɛbelief in an 
open and fluid occupational sector is set against the backdrop of broader social, public policy, 
and academic concerns about the nature of the cultural sector.   
These concerns are focused on questions of inequality in culture. They have come in the form 
of international media controversies such as #oscarssowhite, and of more technical questions 
of workforce composition and skills (House of Lords 2017). This set of public concerns has been 
underpinned by a tradition of research that has bloomed in the last decade, focused on 
questions of the labour market(s) for culture. This research has been cross-disciplinary, ranging 
from media studies (e.g. Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2010) to sociological perspectives (Conor et 
al 2015, K ?ƌŝĞŶet al 2016).  
This paper addresses both the public concerns as well as the sociological literature on cultural 
work by exploring the attitudes of those working in the sector to broader questions of 
ŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ŽĨ ‘ŐĞƚƚŝŶŐŝŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŐĞƚƚŝŶŐŽŶ ?ŝŶĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĂŶĚĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?dŽĚĂƚĞƚŚĞ
ŵĂũŽƌƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽŶĐƵůƚƵƌĂůǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶ&ůŽƌŝĚĂ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ
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ƚŚĂƚĂŝŵĞĚƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨĂ ‘ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞĐůĂƐƐ ?, with more open, tolerant, eclectic 
and meritocratic attitudes than the rest of the (American) society in which they lived.  
In the British context, from where our data is drawn, there is a tradition of qualitative 
engagement with ethnographic and interview data that has revealed a variety of orientations 
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ‘ŐĞƚƚŝŶŐĂŚĞĂĚ ?ŝŶĐƵůƚƵƌĂůǁŽƌŬ ?ƐĞĞK ?ƌŝĞŶĂŶĚKĂŬůĞǇ 2015 for a review), including 
theorising the sense of guilt or failure when confronted with the structural inequalities 
endemic to the creative sector (McRobbie 2016). Our present study is unique as it explores 
these issues quantitatively, drawing on attitudinal research literature which contextualises 
cultural workers in terms of broader social understandings of inequality.  
As a result, the paper makes three core contributions. Our analysis shows cultural workers, in 
surprising contrast to the Floridian (2002) thesis of being open and meritocratic, have attitudes 
to inequality that are broadly similar to the general population. We demonstrate that, in our 
dataset, those with the strongest attachment to meritocratic views, that the cultural sector 
rewards hard work and talent, are those in the highest paid occupational locations. In support 
of McRobbie (2015), we find that younger respondents who are well paid are less likely to hold 
critical or socially transformative attitudes, offering qualified support for the idea of 
individualisation as a useful lens with which to view  the cultural sector.  
dŚĞƉĂƉĞƌ ?ƐĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ?ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶƋƵĂŶƚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ ? ŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůƐƚƵĚǇŽĨǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?
attitudes, also has importance for public, media, and policy discussions. The view of the arts as 
potentially socially transformative, rewarding talent and hard work, has an important place in 
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how the cultural sector is narrated in contemporary society (e.g. Hancock 2016).  It is present 
ŝŶ>ƵŵůĞǇ ?ƐǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƚŽƌĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƐŝƐƚĞƌŚŽŽĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ďŽǇƐŝŶƚŚĞďĂŶĚ ? ?Our data 
and analysis suggests workers in the sector share this narrative. However, if it is the case that 
those working in the sector believe in its fairness, in light of the recent relentlessness of media 
reports on inequality in culture, the prospects for social change may be rather limited. To 
explore this point further, we begin by discussing existing research on cultural work, move 
through a discussion of academic understandings of social attitudes towards meritocracy, 
before presenting our data, analysis and the conclusions supporting our academic and, more 
publically troubling, conclusions.  
1.1: Studying cultural and creative work 
There are longstanding academic debates, research programmes and disciplinary traditions 
associated with the study of Cultural and Creative Industries (CCIs). We can think through this 
literature as having three phases and three distinct forms associated with a range of differing 
positions on the virtues, or otherwise, of working in a cultural or creative job. The first consists 
of those writers and policy makers who have attempted to theorise what cultural and creative 
labour is, and where the specific boundaries of creative occupations can be drawn. Second 
there are the debates around inequalities in cultural and creative work, with some (e.g. Florida 
2002) arguing for cultural jobs to be seen as a blueprint or model for the rest of society, while 
others are much more critical of working life in cultural and creative industries. Finally there is 
ŵŽƌĞƌĞĐĞŶƚůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŽƌŝƐĞĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝonship to broader social trends, 
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including urban policy (Evans 2000), gender (Luckman 2015, Conor et al 2015), management 
practice (Harney 2015) and cultural theory itself (exemplified by a recent collections by Banks 
et al 2013). 
Understanding what, exactly, constitutes CCIs has been a longstanding problem. The original 
advocates for taking cultural production seriously as part of the economy (e.g. McRobbie 2002) 
were directly concerned with highlighting both the transformative and in some cases 
emancipatory nature of cultural production and its potential for economic and, in the case of 
cities and local jurisdictions, political impact (see K ?ƌŝĞŶ 2014 for a detailed discussion of this 
history). However, the eventual establishment of cultural and creative industries in the form 
recognised across Britain and Commonwealth nations broadened out the set of occupations to 
include a focus on the production and control of intellectual property, bringing computer 
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐĂŶĚ/dŝŶƚŽĂŶĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚƐĞƚŽĨ ‘creative ? ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽŵĞƌĞůǇ ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ?, industries.  
ThiƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĂŶĚĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐŚĂƐƌĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĞĚƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨ ‘ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ĂƚƚŚĞ
centre of the occupational boundary drawing exercise to delimit the creative and cultural 
industries from other parts of the economy. For the purposes of this paper, and to speak to the 
context of the DCMS/UK model of creative and cultural occupations, what follows uses nine 
overarching sectors of the economy (IT, software and computer Services; Advertising and 
marketing; Music, performing and visual arts; Product, graphic, and fashion design; Publishing; 
Film, TV, video, radio, and photography; Crafts; Architecture; Museums, galleries and libraries), 
corresponding to 30 individual occupations. 
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The recent expansion of discussions over the impact of cultural and creative labour on a range 
of intellectual and social sectors has been crucial to reinforcing the perception of cultural and 
ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞǁŽƌŬĂƐǁŽƌƚŚŽĨƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐĞĞKĂŬůĞǇĂŶĚK ?ŽŶŶŽr 2015 for a summary). In 
addition to the research base there has been, in both the UK and USA, extensive media and 
public discussion of these issues. There is considerable interest in the issue of inequality in 
access to cultural work, the implications of this access for representations, and then the 
subsequent relationship to cultural consumption (Allen et al 2017).  
1.2: What do we know about inequality in cultural and creative occupations? 
dŚĞƐƚŽƌǇŽĨĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĂŶĚĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ ‘ŵĞƌŝƚŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ? ǁĂƐĂƚƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĞŽĨ&ůŽƌŝĚĂ ?Ɛ
(2002) Rise of the Creative Class, a text that did much to set the tone for public policy debates 
and served as a point around which critical research was orientated. Subsequent academics 
however (summarised in K ?ƌŝĞŶ2014) did much to suggest that the narrative of a creative 
class was confined only to those with the privilege to be able to join. Critical research made it 
clear that there is a mismatch between narratives of an open, meritocratic, set of occupations 
and the sƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐƚŽƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĂƌĞŶŽƚƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞĨĂƵůƚ ?ĂĨĨůƵĞŶƚ, white, middle class 
male.    
We can use DĐZŽďďŝĞ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ?) recent work as a key example here. She identifies the tension 
between the structures of cultural labour markets and the narratives associated with work 
within those subsectors of the economy. Cultural work is narrated as open to everyone, while 
entry is denied to those without affluence (in the form of unpaid internships), those without 
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social connections (usually in the form of elite education), and those deviating from a norm of 
able-bodied youthfulness. Her theorisation draws on critiques of working conditions 
(Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2010; McRobbie 2002) in cultural occupations, institutional barriers 
to access (Conor et al 2015) and ƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚƐŽĨĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞ
economy (Oakley 2014).  
The questions as to how cultural labour markets are structured (e.g Koppman 2015, K ?ƌŝĞŶet 
al 2016, Gill 2002, Saha 2015, Conor et al 2015) have been shown to have a close relationship 
ƚŽŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ?/ŶƐŽŵĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƚŚŝƐŝƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƐŚĂƌĞĚĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ?
ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝŶ<ŽƉƉŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨƚĂƐƚĞŝŶŵĂƚĐŚŝŶŐĂĨĨůƵĞŶƚŽƌŝŐŝŶ
candidates to jobs in advertising. For otheƌƐ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞŚŝůĚƌĞƐƐĂŶĚ'ĞƌďĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?
analysis of visual artists ? ethical orientations towards financial elements of the market for their 
labour, attitudes structure the very possibility of having a sustainable career in a cultural 
occupation. To return to McRobbie (2014), who offers the most fully theorised understanding 
of attitudes and labour markets, we see the cultural workers ? commitment to their occupation 
offering a sense of identity. This vocational element (Dubois 2016) is powerful enough to see 
cultural workers forego occupations with more stability and employment protections in favour 
of cultural work.  
This commitment is in the face of a labour market for occupations that is deeply exclusionary. 
Recent analysis of 2014 Labour Force Survey (LFS) data in the UK (K ?ƌŝĞŶet al 2016, Oakley et 
al 2017) demonstrated the overrepresentation of those from professional or managerial 
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occupational origins across the cultural sector, with particular issues in publishing, music and 
design. Underrepresentations of women were especially acute in film, TV, radio and 
photography, an underrepresentation matched by low levels of Black, Asian, and Minority 
Ethnic (BAME) individuals in the cultural and creative labour force. The analysis also indicated 
pay gaps according to gender and class origin in many of the occupations surveyed, suggesting 
even where those from outside the whiƚĞ ?ŵĂůĞ ?ŵŝĚĚůĞĐůĂƐƐŽƌŝŐŝŶ ‘ŶŽƌŵ ?ŽĨĐƵůƚƵƌĂů
occupations were working in the sector, they potentially faced lower rates of pay. 
This analysis of the cultural labour force raises two questions. On the one hand there is a 
question of how this social structure is experienced, something of which the existing literature 
surveyed above has offered a detailed overview. Second, and less well developed in existing 
work, is the question of how these structures are perpetuated through attitudes and 
assumptions of those occupied in cultural labour. There is thus still a need to understand how 
barriers to getting in and getting on operate. Here understanding broader attitudes towards 
inequality, as a route to understanding how these attitudes function within creative work, is 
essential. 
1.3: What do we know about attitudes to inequality? 
Crucially, it does not follow that inequalities in CCIs mean that people working in or around 
CCIs believe that the sector is unequal: for example, people in the sector may erroneously 
believe that people from different class backgrounds are paid the same. In addition, people 
may acknowledge that inequalities exist, but they may believe that inequalities are just and 
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fair: they may believe that success is overwhelmingly determined by talent, and they may 
believe the most talented people happen to come disproportionately from privileged 
backgrounds.  
Both within and beyond the CCIs, pĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐďĞůŝĞĨƐĂďŽƵƚŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇƚĂŬĞĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ
dimensions, including both knowledge of inequality and normative beliefs about inequality. 
McCall and Chin (2013) investigate what people believe the ratios between the highest- and 
lowest-paid workers in organisations are and what they should be. They find that not only do 
people believe that high and low pay should be closer together, they also significantly 
underestimate actual discrepancies, believing that the income distribution is more equal than 
it actually is. Loveless and Whitefield (2011) investigate more generally questions of  ‘social 
inequality ?, asking whether levels of social inequality where people live are too high, about 
right, or too low. Isaksson and Lindskog (2009) investigate whether people believe that 
government should intervene in order to change the situation.  
Here, we focus on perceived inequality of opportunity (Brunori 2015). This dimension is 
measured by presenting respondents with a battery of items, and asking how important each 
of those is in terms of getting ahead. Respondents who report that coming from a wealthy 
family, knowing the right people, and having been born a man are all essential to getting 
ahead might be considered to perceive inequality of opportunity as high, while a respondent 
who considers those items to be not at all important, while holding ambition and hard work as 
essential, might be considered to perceive inequality of opportunity as low. These responses 
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can be considered to incorporate both knowledge and normative beliefs. It is impossible to 
ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĞǆĂĐƚůǇŚŽǁŵƵĐŚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĐĂŶ be attributed to their hard work, but the 
literature generally finds that people who are better-informed about workplace conditions 
perceive inequality of opportunity as higher. Batteries of this form have been used in large-
scale social surveys including the General Social Survey in the USA, and the International Social 
Survey Programme1.  
Studies using these batteries of questions tend to find that ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐďĞůŝĞĨƐĂďŽƵƚŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ
are that processes err on the side of fairness, with overall higher scores on items like  ‘hard 
work ? than  ‘coming from a wealthy family ?. However, this varies internationally, with people in 
richer countries generally believing that processes are fairer than do people in poorer 
countries (Brunori 2015). In addition, men generally perceive greater inequality, as do older 
people (Hanson and Wells-Dang 2005), while the relationship between perception of 
inequality and education varies cross-nationally (Hanson and Wells-Dang 2005; Reynolds and 
Xian 2014). 
However, while these relationships vary cross-nationally, the correlations between attitudes 
themselves are relatively stable.  Both Hanson and Wells-Dang (2009) and Reynolds and Xian 
(2014) use factor analysis on the batteries of questions in order to either construct or validate 
scales; in this way, they investigate whether people who rate  ‘being a man ? as important rate 
                                                          
1 It has also been shown that different measurements of attitudes to inequality are related: those who 
believe inequality to be greater are also more skeptical of equality of opportunity (McCall and Chin, 
2013) 
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 ‘talenƚ ? as being less important. In both papers, there are fairly coherent scales constitutive of 
effort, hard work, and similar. These are described as either  ‘meritocracy ? or  ‘human capital ?. 
Higher scores on these scales correspond to more egalitarian beliefs about how society works. 
Both papers also find two scales that can be considered to be in tension with this,  ‘ascriptive ? 
or  ‘structural ?, and  ‘discrimination ? or  ‘friends and family ?. The first of these consists of race, 
religion, and gender; the latter consists of coming from a wealthy family and knowing the right 
people. While high scores on each of these scales both correspond to less egalitarian beliefs 
about how society works, they are also distinct from each other; it is plausible to believe that 
discrimination takes place because of who you know rather than more fundamental 
demographic issues. Finally, Hanson and Wells-Dang find a fourth factor, with the heaviest 
loadings coming from ŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ? This can be 
seen as being relatively orthogonal to questions of fairness; it is possible to construct 
narratives around education being used as an arbitrary barrier to entry, and around it being a 
way to suitably train people for roles. 
In addition, while these dimensions differ in their perceived inequality of opportunity  W those 
with higher scores on meritocracy are likely to perceive inequality of opportunity as lower, 
while those with higher scores on discrimination are likely to perceive it as higher  W the 
dimensions are not at odds with each other. As they are constructed via principal components 
analysis, the dimensions are relatively independent of one another. In addition, it is not 
ŝŶĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚƚŽƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇŚŽůĚƚŚĂƚŝƚ ?ƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽďĞŚĂƌĚ-working and talented and to 
be a white man from a wealthy family: someone holding such a position might recognise 
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structural discrimination, while believing that privileged people can only get ahead if they are 
also talented and hard-working. Similarly, some people score low on all these dimensions; this 
might reflect that they believe that who gets ahead is more-or-less random, or indeed that the 
ƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŐĞƚƚŝŶŐĂŚĞĂĚǁĞƌĞŶ ?ƚŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞďĂƚƚĞƌǇŽĨ
questions. 
The relevance of these attitudes to the cultural and creative industries is clear. Brunori (2015) 
shows that, in general, people in rich societies tend to think those societies are meritocratic. 
However, if the creative class hypothesis is correct (Florida, 2002), and people working in the 
cultural and creative industries tend to be more left-wing and more liberal than the overall 
population, with attitudes of tolerance and openness and a commitment to meritocracy, it 
follows that those people are likely to at least think more critically about who gets ahead. This 
is particularly salient, given both the research surveyed earlier in this paper which shows 
structural exclusions in cultural jobs, and the fact that these structural exclusions are well-
known to participants (see eg Friedman and K ?ƌŝĞŶ2017 on the acting profession). As a 
result, one would expect people working in the cultural and creative industries to be more 
conscious of processes of social reproduction, and more critical of meritocratic accounts of the 
cultural sector in which the cream rises to the top. 
The cultural and creative industries are, of course, not a monoculture. Even if overall attitudes 
within the sector are more sceptical of a meritocratic account of success as compared to 
attitudes across society, structural effects may persist. These effects would be as a result of 
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overrepresented groups being less likely to acknowledge the inequalities that may have 
smoothed the processes leading to their own professional success.  
In the event that members of groups who experience exclusion are more alert to the exclusion 
itself, we would expect faith in meritocracy to be weaker for those groups of non-white, non-
male, less affluent origin individuals, and for communities that are under-represented in 
cultural work and experience exclusions from cultural labour markets. However, as our data 
will demonstrate, the picture is complex, showing a cluster of occupations whose practitioners 
have a strong belief in the meritocratic nature of cultural work, albeit one that is strongly 
socially stratified.  
2: Data and methods 
Data were collected over the period 21 September-20 October 2015, via an online survey 
ŚŽƐƚĞĚĂƚƚŚĞ'ƵĂƌĚŝĂŶƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŚĞĂĚůŝŶĞ ‘ŽǇŽƵǁŽƌŬŝŶƚŚĞĂƌƚƐ ?ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ŽƌĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞ
industries? Take our survey on diversŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌ ? ?dŚĞƐƵƌǀĞǇǁĂƐůĂƵŶĐŚĞĚĂƐĂƉĂƌƚŽĨĂ
partnership between academics and a range of cultural organisations seeking to understand 
issues of inequality in the sector, accompanying a series of events on the same topic across 
England; this partnership is described at more length at this link. At its launch, the survey was 
ŚŽƐƚĞĚƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚůǇŽŶƚŚĞŶĞǁƐƉĂƉĞƌ ?ƐǁĞďƐŝƚĞ ?ĂŶĚǁĂƐƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇƉƵďůŝĐŝƐed across social 
media across the lifespan of the survey. This included publicity from prominent organisations 
ĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƋƵŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞDƵƐŝĐŝĂŶƐ ?hŶŝŽŶ ?ƌƚƐŽƵŶĐŝůŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ĂŶĚ
several others. 
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Because of this recruitment method, this is a non-representative sample and should be treated 
in that way. While results may be indicative of a population of people working in the CCIs, they 
also may not; conclusions are limited to those participants who opted in to the survey. 
However, as the introduction has indicated, these issues are supported by existing, more 
representative, survey material. /ŶƚŚĞĚĞƐŝŐŶŽĨƚŚĞƐƵƌǀĞǇ ?ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂƌŽƵŶĚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?
their social origins, and demographic characteristics were designed so that responses could be 
compared with those in the rolling and nationally-representative Labour Force Survey (LFS), 
while questions about social contacts were designed to be comparable with those in the 
Cultural Capital and Social Exclusion survey (Bennett et al, 2008). By using comparable 
questions we can identify how different the sample is from the population its members are 
drawn from.  
These efforts have been made to benchmark the sample against the population against which 
its members have been drawn from, precisely because of the difficulties associated with 
recruiting a large sample of people working in the cultural and creative industries. Recent work 
on the social composition of the cultural and creative industry workforce (K ?ƌŝĞŶet al 2016) 
has been limited to analysis of the LFS. While the LFS is nationally representative, it consists of 
relatively few people working within the sector, and contains no attitudinal questions at all. 
The LFS is an ideal data source for understanding the social makeup of the CCIs, but not for 
understanding more specific labour practices within the sector, nor for understanding 
attitudes and beliefs within the sector. Data were therefore collected through this online 
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platform and with partners to maximise responses from the CCIs on the practices and beliefs 
not covered by LFS. 
In total, there were 2540 responses to the survey, of which an estimated 53 were duplicates, 
leaving a total of 2487 cases. Duplicates were identified on the basis of identical responses to 
free text fields if applicable; for those respondents who did not use free text fields, duplicates 
were identified as cases where age, browser, and postcode coincided. This sample of 2487 
people working in the cultural and creative industries represents the largest survey of this 
group of which we are aware. The survey involved a total of 7 sections. The first was on 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƌŽůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĂŶĚĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐ PƚŚĞŝƌďƌŽĂĚƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?ƚŚĞŝƌƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐũŽď ?ǁŚĂƚ
they mainly do in their job, and whether that job is their main source of income. The second 
ǁĂƐŽŶŚŽǁůŽŶŐƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞďĞĞŶǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ had done before if they 
had not only worked in the cultural and creative industries. The third asked detailed questions 
about their sources of income and outgoings, while the fourth asked about their experiences 
of working without pay. The fifth, which we analyse in this paper ?ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞĚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ? 
attitudes towards what is important in getting ahead in their sector, while the final questions 
asked about social contacts and relevant demographic questions (including questions on social 
origin).   
Here, we focus on the questions about getting ahead. We use the battery of questions 
described above about perceived inequality of opportunity, validated in a variety of different 
national and cross-national contexts (eg Brunori, 2015; Reynolds and Xian, 2014; Hanson and 
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Wells-Dang, 2015). In most surveys, the question is asked  ‘Please tick one box for each of these 
to show how important you think it is ĨŽƌŐĞƚƚŝŶŐĂŚĞĂĚŝŶůŝĨĞ ? ?, and presented with a series of 
items. In this case, the options remain the same, but the stimulus is changed to  ‘Looking at 
your creative occupation as a whole, how important do you think each of these is in getting 
ahead? ?. Responses to these questions should be seen in the context of the questions that 
precede it; immediately before these questions, respondents were asked about income and 
about working for free. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, we report descriptive statistics of each of the items 
within this bank of questions, and for relevant indicator variables. Second, we describe 
principal components analysis on this same bank of questions, in order to identify whether 
these items can be reduced to a smaller number of latent variables. Third, we use regressions 
to understand how attitudes towards inequality vary between groups, whether those people 
in more privileged positions and from more privileged backgrounds are more likely to find the 
cultural sector fair and equitable. Analysis was conducted in Stata 14.1, and graphics were 
prepared in R using the ggplot2 package. 
3: Results 
3.1: Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for relevant indicator variables, and Figure 1 shows the 
distributions of responses to each item in the bank of questions about getting ahead, on a 
ƐĐĂůĞĨƌŽŵ “ŶŽƚĂƚĂůůŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ?ƚŽ “ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ?. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for independent variables used in analysis 
Variable Mean N 
Disability status 0.22 2487 
Ethnicity = white 0.88 2090 
Education = degree or greater 0.82 2487 
Age (sd) 
36.97 
(11.05) 
2468 
Gender 
  Male 0.31 2486 
Female 0.69 2486 
Other 0.01 2486 
Sector 
  Advertising/marketing 0.06 2486 
Architecture 0.01 2486 
Craft 0.02 2486 
Design 0.06 2486 
Film/TV/Video/Radio/Photography 0.08 2486 
IT 0.02 2486 
Museums/Galleries/Libraries 0.15 2486 
NA/Other 0.1 2486 
Performance/Music 0.29 2486 
Publishing 0.07 2486 
Visual Arts 0.12 2486 
Income 
  >5k 0.28 2487 
5-10k 0.1 2487 
10-20k 0.16 2487 
20-30k 0.24 2487 
30-50k 0.17 2487 
>50k 0.06 2487 
Parent's occupation 
  
Senior manager 0.19 2486 
Traditional professional 0.18 2486 
Middle/junior manager 0.09 2486 
 18 
Modern professional 0.29 2486 
NS-SEC 3-7 0.24 2486 
Time in the industry 
 
 >6 months 0.08 2486 
6 months-1 year 0.05 2486 
1-2 years 0.09 2486 
2-5 years 0.19 2486 
5-10 years 0.21 2486 
More than 10 years 0.38 2486 
Region 
  East of England 0.05 2347 
West Midlands 0.04 2347 
East Midlands 0.03 2347 
North East 0.03 2347 
North West 0.07 2347 
Yorkshire 0.05 2347 
South East 0.11 2347 
London 0.45 2347 
South West 0.06 2347 
Wales 0.04 2347 
Northern Ireland 0.01 2347 
Scotland 0.07 2347 
 
Figure 1: descriptive statistics of attitudes towards getting ahead ?ĨƌŽŵ “ŶŽƚĂƚĂůůŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ? 
ƚŽ “ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ? 
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Table 1 shows that the distribution of parts of the CCIs in the survey are different from the 
national distribution from the Labour Force Survey (K ?ƌŝĞŶet al 2016, table 1), most 
conspicuously by the underrepresentation of workers in IT (2% compared with 29%), and the 
overrepresentation of workers in performance and music (29% compared with 9%) and in 
museums, galleries and libraries (15% compared with 3%).  
A relatively high percentage of respondents (22%) reported at least one disability; in most 
cases, this related to mental health. Most respondents had at least an undergraduate degree 
(82%, compared with 64% across the CCIs). A large majority of respondents (69%) were 
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women, while the only CCIs that are predominantly women in the LFS are women are 
museums, galleries and libraries, and publishing (K ?ƌŝĞŶet al 2016, table 1). Respondents 
were generally poorly paid: 28% received less than £5k pa from their practice, with only 23% 
receiving more than £30k pa. Only 24% of respondents classified both parents as being in 
anything other than professional or managerial jobs, indicating that the sample 
overwhelmingly consists of people from what might be classified as  ‘middle-class 
backgrounds ? ? This is an even smaller fraction than in the CCIs as a whole (K ?ƌŝĞŶet al 2016, 
table 2).  88% of the sample identified themselves as white, a slightly smaller fraction than the 
CCIs overall, and a similar figure to that of the overall UK population; however, this looks 
unusually white given that a huge 45% of respondents were based in London, which was 
overall 60% white at the 2011 census. Finally, the mean age in the sample is just under 37 
(compared with just over 41 for the CCIs overall: K ?ƌŝĞŶet al 2016, table A2), and relatively 
few respondents are new to their sector, with just 13% having worked in it for less than a year.  
The CCI workers that make up our survey are clearly different from the CCIs across the Labour 
Force Survey in a number of ways. We have more actors, musicians and other performers, 
while we have fewer programmers; we have more women; we have more people living in 
London.  Given recruitment was opt-in, participants are those who recognise themselves as 
working in the cultural and creative industries, and who find out about a survey hosted at the 
Guardian (likely through unions and relevant professional bodies). Indeed, these are the 
sectors who receive more of the celebratory discourse around the cultural and creative 
industries, in spite of representing a relatively small part of their workforce and an even 
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smaller part of contribution to GDP for which they are often lauded. In this way, it is closer to 
representing an ideal type image of the CCIs: probably young, highly-educated women in 
London whose parents had middle class jobs.  
Figure 1 shows that the highest-rated attribute overall for getting ahead is  ‘hard work ?, rated 
 ‘essential ? by 62% of the sample, and followed closely behind by  ‘ambition ?, rated  ‘essential ? by 
54% of the sample. At the opposite extreme is  ‘your religion ?, rated  ‘not important at all ? by 
67% of the sample, followed by  ‘your ethnicity ? at 35% (and another 25%  ‘not very important ?). 
In general, figure 1 indicates that attributes associated with a meritocratic account of the CCIs 
are more highly-regarded than attributes associated with an account consistent with 
reproduction, with one exception P ? ?A?ŽĨƚŚĞƐĂŵƉůĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚ ?ƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƚŽŬŶŽǁƚŚĞ
ƌŝŐŚƚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ǁŝƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?A?ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƚ ?ƐǀĞƌǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ? These results are broadly 
similar to those in other studies, indicating that our CCI respondents hold similar attitudes 
about inequality of opportunity in their sectors as people living in rich countries do about the 
societies in which they live. Whether this is in tension with the creative class thesis depends on 
ŽŶĞ ?ƐƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨŝƚ ?KŶƚŚĞŽŶĞŚĂŶĚ ?ĂŶĂŢǀĞƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨthe thesis suggests that the CCIs 
ŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůǇĂƌĞŵŽƌĞŽƉĞŶ ?ŵĞƌŝƚŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĂŶĚĨĂŝƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐŽŝƚ ?ƐĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇ
appropriate that people within that sector are more likely to report that talent and hard work 
are essential than class and coming from a wealthy family. On the other, as section 1.2 shows, 
there are major systematic inequalities in the CCIs. Holding these attitudes suggests either our 
respondents are unaware of these inequalities, or that they believe that the processes leading 
to these inequalities are legitimate. 
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3.2: Principal components analysis 
As with other studies using the same or similar questions, in order to identify latent variables 
representing broad attitudes towards getting ahead we use principal components analysis and 
conduct a varimax rotation, with a minimum eigenvector value of 1. This analysis retains 3 
factors, with loadings shown in figure 2, and with a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test of sampling 
adequacy of 0.85, providing support for the use of principal components analysis. 
Figure 2: loading of each attitudinal variable onto three principal components 
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This analysis retains three distinctive factors, which we have labelled  ‘reproduction ?, 
 ‘meritocracy ?, and  ‘education ?. Each of the variables intuitively associated with a reproduction 
account  W gender, ethnicity, knowing the right people, coming from a wealthy family, class, 
and religion  W has a weighting on the  ‘reproduction ? factor of over 0.3; the same is true for 
ambition, hard work, and talent on the  ‘meritocracy ? factor. A third factor is dominated by 
 ‘your education ?, although  ‘having well-educated parents ? is also prominent. Each item in the 
battery of questions has a loading of at least 0.3 onto exactly one factor. 
The crucial difference between these results and those in the other papers described above is 
the fact that non-meritocratic variables are all in a single factor, while in other work these 
variables can be distinguished into  ‘friends and family ? and  ‘discrimination ?. In other studies, it 
is consistent to hold that being well-connected is crucial for getting ahead while factors 
associated with more explicit discrimination, such as racism, are not salient. Instead, here, they 
are coherent in a single  ‘reproduction ? factor. The other factors,  ‘meritocracy ? and  ‘education ?, 
ĂƌĞĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚǁŚĂƚ ?ƐƐĞĞŶĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ? 
This means there are three basic dimensions of attitudes for people working in the CCIs. 
People who believe that coming from a wealthy family is important tend to also believe that 
knowing the right people is important, as are class, gender, and ethnicity. We do not see the 
difference seen in other studies, in which people who believe that knowing the right people is 
essential do not necessarily believe that class, gender, and ethnicity are. In our data these 
attitudes tend to coincide. On this basis, discussing attitudes to success among people working 
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ŝŶƚŚĞ/ƐĂƐĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚŝŶŐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐďĞůŝĞĨŝŶŵĞƌŝƚŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ŝŶƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ
in education is validated by the analysis. The next stage is to identify who holds which of these 
attitudes. 
3.3 Regression results 
Is it the white men from middle class backgrounds who are most likely to believe that culture is 
meritocratic, and that social reproduction does not have a major role to play? In this section, 
we report the results of regressions with each factor as a dependent variable, to understand 
which variables most strongly predict attitudes. There are three parallel models, across which 
the independent variables are the same; the differences are the dependent variables. 
We have chosen independent variables to understand whether people who are structurally 
advantaged in the CCIs are more likely to believe that the sector is meritocratic than those 
ƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŚŽƐĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐ, whether white men people from middle-
ĐůĂƐƐďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚƐǁŚŽĚŽŶ ?ƚƌĞƉŽƌƚĚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞƚŚĞŵŽƐƚůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
processes that underpinned their success are basically fair. We also reflect on ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?
current position in the sector, measured through their longevity and through their current pay, 
to reflect on whether meritocratic attitudes are also held by those most able to make decisions 
in the sector. If those who determine how hiring works in the CCIs are also those who think 
that the current process is meritocratic, it is unlikely that this process will change, and patterns 
of inequality reflected in the sector will persist. 
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While tests for multicollinearity do not raise questions, with the only variance inflation factors 
over 10 deriving from the squared age term, the second dependent variable is left-skewed (see 
figure 2), with models predicting this variable showing deviations from a normal quantile-
quantile plot, and with heteroskedastic residuals. Because of these issues, we use robust 
standard errors to account for the divergences from the assumptions of simple ordinary least 
squares regressions.  
 
Table 3: regression results with column headings representing depending variables. 
 
Reproduction Meritocracy Education 
Disabled 0.404*** -0.0721 0.0785 
Ethnicity = white -1.076*** 0.21 -0.0368 
Education = degree+ 0.0908 -0.114 0.192**  
Age 0.0536 -0.0528* 0.0124 
Age squared -0.000635 0.000489* -0.00014 
Gender (base = male) 
  Female 0.239** 0.272*** 0.103 
Other 1.661 -0.307 0.331 
Sector (base = advertising/marketing 
 Architecture -0.185 0.0319 0.417*   
Crafts -0.815* 0.526* -0.477*   
Deisgn -0.246 0.334* -0.311*   
Film/TV/video/radio/photography 0.329 0.201 -0.267 
IT 0.162 -0.298 -0.671**  
Museums, galleries, libraries -0.0947 -0.439** 0.138 
NA/other 0.31 -0.0286 -0.0288 
Peformance/music 0.522** 0.098 -0.203 
Publishing 0.277 -0.243 0.277*   
Visual arts 0.407* 0.075 -0.0855 
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Income (base >5k) 
  5-10k -0.133 0.137 0.184 
10-20k -0.415** 0.161 0.139 
20-30k -0.795*** 0.187 0.157 
30-50k -1.027*** 0.384*** 0.122 
50k+ -1.423*** 0.681*** 0.142 
Parents' occupation (base = NS-SEC 3-7) 
Senior manager -0.24 0.0544 -0.118 
Traditional professional -0.253* 0.262* 0.0278 
Middle/junior manager -0.195 0.0766 -0.116 
Modern professional -0.129 0.137 0.12 
Time in sector (base >6mo) 
 6mo-1yr 0.0864 -0.0689 0.0954 
1-2 years -0.0536 0.0145 0.0281 
2-5 years 0.0421 0.0484 0.0916 
5-10 years -0.0316 -0.0394 0.0853 
10 years+ -0.00314 0.0131 0.104 
Region (base: East of England) 
 West Midlands -0.247 0.429* 0.0157 
East Midlands 0.0742 0.0712 0.0879 
North East -0.252 0.103 -0.227 
North West 0.00628 0.0215 -0.0296 
Yorkshire -0.0943 0.0614 -0.0541 
South East -0.0653 -0.0769 0.0479 
London 0.352 -0.156 -0.0233 
South West 0.122 0.0861 -0.036 
Wales -0.16 0.154 0.0327 
Northern Ireland -0.642 0.493* -0.325 
Scotland -0.0824 0.0537 0.0254 
Constant -0.305 0.696 -0.599 
N 1985 1985 1985 
R squared 0.1715 0.0648 0.0516 
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Of the three models, by far the highest R squared value is from the model predicting the 
 ‘reproduction ? factor. We follow by briefly summarising the results of each model, followed by 
reflection on the results across all three. 
We first address the model predicting the  ‘education ? factor. The only things associated with 
large coefficients2 for ƚŚŝƐĨĂĐƚŽƌĂƌĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ŽǁŶĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶůĞǀĞůƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐ ĐƚŽƌŝŶ
which they work. People working in each of publishing and architecture hold particularly high 
scores on this factor. This is unsurprising, as in the case of architecture holding higher-level 
qualifications in the discipline is necessary in order to practice, while in publishing a large 
fraction of workers have postgraduate qualifications. Meanwhile, people working in IT are 
particularly unlikely to think education is important to getting ahead.  
Other than those variables, though, no other is strongly associated with this factor; this is also 
reflected in the particularly low R-squared for this model.   
The model predicting the  ‘meritocracy ? factor varies by more of the independent variables, 
although several still have relatively small associations. Younger people have higher 
meritocracy scores, although the difference between an 18-year old and a 25-year old are 
smaller than those between a 48-year old and a 55-year old, as shown by the quadratic term. 
Women score higher on this scale than do men. Sector-wise, people in each of crafts and 
design have higher scores than the average, while people working in museums and galleries 
                                                          
2 While these tables include stars for significance testing, this is misleading as the sample was not 
randomly selected from a population. Because of this, we focus mainly on effect sizes, highlighting 
differences between groups, rather than measures of statistical significance. 
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score lowest of all on this scale. ƌƵĐŝĂůůǇ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƐĐŽƌĞƐŽŶƚŚĞŵĞƌŝƚŽĐƌĂĐǇĨĂĐƚŽƌŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĂƐ
does their income, with very large differences between the highest and lowest parts of the 
scale. ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ?ŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞƐŵĂůůĞƌ. People from 
traditional professional backgrounds score higher than others, but not wildly, and the 
differences between other parental backgrounds are marginal. Regional variation is fairly low. 
This model has a scarcely higher R-squared than that for education, implying that it is not the 
case that groups who are more systematically advantaged within the cultural sector are more 
likely to believe that the processes through which people get ahead are more legitimate 
compared with people who do not have those same systematic advantages. 
The model predicting the  ‘reproduction ? factor reflects that of the  ‘meritocracy ? factor in some 
ways, but not all. Women score higher on this factor, as they do on meritocracy, and there is 
ĞǀĞŶůĞƐƐƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůǀĂƌŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŝŶŝŶĐŽŵĞĂŶĚƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ?ŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶƌĞĨůĞĐƚƚŚŽƐĞ
for  ‘meritocracy ? ? However, while the differences for people from traditional professional 
backgrounds are roughly as negative as ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐďǇŽŶĞ ?ƐŝŶĐŽŵĞ
are even larger. However, while on the  ‘meritocracy ? factor there were only small differences 
by disability and ethnicity, on  ‘reproduction ? people with disabilities score moderately higher 
than people without disabilities, and white people score drastically lower than non-white 
people. Finally, occupational differences also vary: here, the groups with highest scores on 
 “ƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƌĞƚŚŽƐĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŝŶƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞĂŶĚŵƵƐŝĐ ?ĂŶĚŝŶǀŝƐƵĂůĂƌƚƐ ?
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When we compare the three models, it is immediately clear that the starkest differences are 
found in the model predicting belief in social reproduction: this model has both the highest R-
square and the largest coefficients. In some ways, this reflects the larger variance within this 
category: almost everyone thinks that hard work and talent are important in terms of getting 
ahead, with the crucial differences in the  ‘meritocracy ? scale being between the highly-paid 
and everyone else. By contrast, mean scores on the items that make up the  ‘reproduction ? 
scale are lower, and differences on these scores differ more consistently across groups of 
interest. While the crucial difference on the  ‘meritocracy ? scale was about pay, the differences 
between the high- and low-paid on reproduction are twice the size of those on meritocracy, 
with additional differences on ethnicity and disability. Surprisingly, women score higher than 
men on both of these scales.  
Perhaps the most surprising finding is the relatively small coefficients associated with 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚƐ. The only significant differences between those people whose 
parents had non-managerial or professional jobs are those whose parents were traditional 
professionals. This is surprising for two reasons. The first is that one might expect that the 
magnitude of the differences in incomes between people of different class backgrounds, 
discussed above, would translate into differences between these groups in their recognition of 
how one becomes successful. The second is the moderate numbers of people reporting 
believing that  ‘coming from a wealthy family ? and  ‘your class ? are important to getting ahead. 
While these numbers are dwarfed by those for  ‘knowing the right people ? and  ‘your talent ?, it 
seems here that the belief that class background is moderately important does not map on to 
 30 
people from different class backgrounds having different attitudes towards what is important 
in getting ahead.  
One concern with the models is that, due to the sampling method, they might 
disproportionately weight people who might not be classified as working in the CCIs in other 
sources of data: for example, people earning small amounts of money from their practice, and 
people whose main source of income is not their cultural and creative practice. In order to 
assess whether these results are driven by these groups of people, we also run the model 
excluding first people whose main source of income is not their cultural and creative practice, 
and second excluding people whose earnings from their cultural and creative practice are less 
than £5,000 pa. Making these changes leads to no estimates changing by as much as two 
standard errors.  
More generally, these results make fairly grim reading for those who hope that inequalities in 
the cultural and creative industries might diminish. As shown in figure 1, almost everyone 
believes that hard work, talent, and ambition are essential to getting ahead, while class, 
gender, ethnicity, and coming from a wealthy family are not. People in better positions in the 
sector  W those who are the most highly-paid, and most likely to recruit and elevate the next 
generation  W believe most strongly in the meritocratic account of the sector, and are most 
sceptical of the role of social reproduction. Most strikingly, these attitudes persist whether 
people come from privileged backgrounds or not. It seems that once people have achieved 
success within the sector their attitudes towards how one achieves success are similar 
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regardless of background, and in spite of the substantial body of literature suggesting different 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐĂŶĚďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶŽŶĞ ?ƐďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?
4: Discussion and Conclusion 
There is a straightforward positive reading of these results: The workers who responded to our 
survey think that the sector is more or less fair, with hard work being the most important thing 
for getting ahead, and the least important things being religion, gender, ethnicity and class. 
However, this account is complicated by asking who, exactly, thinks that these are the most 
and least important things respectively. The people in our survey data who are least likely to 
say that the process of getting ahead reflects more general social reproduction are highly-paid 
non-disabled white men. 
We might answer the question  ‘what do cultural workers think about inequality? ? by saying 
 ‘the same as everyone else ?. This is a surprising finding given the Floridian (2002) narrative 
associated with the sectors supposedly more open, tolerant and meritocratic attitudes. It is 
also worth remarking on in the context of the discussions that opened this paper, whereby the 
sector is not  ‘the boys in the band ? and  ‘the sisterhood ?, rather it is much as other parts of 
contemporary society in its attitude towards inequality.  There are surprises  W for example, 
survey respondents ? attitudes towards the importance of knowing the right people and coming 
from a wealthy family load onto the same single factor as your ethnicity and your class, and 
women score higher on both the meritocracy and reproduction factors  W but there is nothing 
here that indicates that the attitudes of our survey respondents are radically different from 
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those working in other sectors, or in none at all. This may imply that awareness of issues of 
access to the CCIs have not got through to this section of people who work in them, or at least 
to any greater extent than the general population. This might be considered surprising, given 
how high-profile the debate around issues of access were at the time of data collection. 
Alternatively, it may be that the issue was high-profile but survey respondents rejected 
accounts in which access to the sector was unequal; this may have felt necessary in order for 
people to justify their own success, preferring to feel that their success in the sector was due 
to their own individual traits rather than more general structural issues. This may be 
particularly relevant given that the people whose account is most in the direction of fairness 
are the people who are most handsomely rewarded by the sector.  Indeed, this sits in the 
context in which there are two different dimensions through which cultural workers express 
their attitudes towards inequality  W reproduction and meritocracy  W and it is not just the case 
that the better-rewarded are more likely to ascribe success to talent, but that they are even 
more likely to deny the relationship between success and structural factors. 
However, one surprising finding, given the recent academic focus on class (e.g. Allen et al 
2017) and its impact on the CCIs, is the relatively weak relationship between attitudes towards 
inequality and class origin. Even if we account for the fact that self-reported descriptions of 
ǁŚĂƚŬŝŶĚƐŽĨũŽďƐƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƉĂƌĞŶƚƐŚĂĚŝƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŽǁĞĂŬĞŶĂŶǇƚƌƵĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ?ƚŚĞ
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĂƌĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůůǇƐŵĂůůĞƌƚŚĂŶĨŽƌƚŚŽƐĞǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ
conditions. This is surprising, as one might expect that survey respondents whose transition 
into working in the CCIs has been relatively smooth, via elite (expensive) institutions and the 
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ability to work for free for long periods without hardship, would be less likely to see structural 
barriers, whereas those people who have directly experienced them would be more likely to 
do so. This is, at least, the narrative one expects given public discussion of inequality in access 
to the sector. It also suggests the need for more work on the causal, rather than just the 
correlative, relationships between class inequalities and production, consumption and 
representation in CCIs (Allen et al 2017), so as to better explain, in our dataset, the relatively 
weak relationship between social class origin and attitudes.  
While we must be cautious about generalisation, given these results, there is no reason to 
imagine that the situation we have discussed is likely to change. According to analysis of our 
survey respondents, access to the CCIs is still constrained by structural factors. These structural 
factors are predominantly recognised by those in the sector in precarious positions, whereas 
those in stronger positions are more likely to generate a meritocratic narrative of how people 
end up in their positions. It is difficult to see where the impetus for the situation to change will 
come from.   
This paper has explored attitudes prevailing within cultural and creative occupations, with a 
focus on inequality. This focus aimed to respond both to media interest in inequality and 
cultural jobs, as well as extending current academic understandings of cultural and creative 
work. It offers important implications for future research. First, as the discussion has indicated, 
attitudes towards inequality in the sample are in keeping with broader social attitudes, 
suggesting cultural and creative labour is neither more nor less well disposed to social critique 
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than other occupations. Concurrently, this finding casts doubt on research that suggests these 
occupations exhibit more meritocratic attitudes than the rest of society. Both critical and 
 ‘ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞĐůĂƐƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƵŶŝƋƵĞŶĞƐƐŽĨĐƵůƚƵƌĂůǁŽƌŬƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƚƌĞĂƚĞĚŵŽƌĞĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐůǇ ?  
 Second, the findings and discussion query the transformative potential of the cultural sector, 
given that it displays a belief in the meritocratic nature of cultural jobs and that belief is 
stronger in those with higher incomes. These attitudes are at odds with research on both the 
shape of the labour market for cultural work (K ?ƌŝĞŶĂŶĚKĂŬůĞǇ 2015) and the composition of 
the cultural workforce (K ?ƌŝĞŶet al r 2016).  
Indeed, the evidence that the younger and the higher earning, respondents have higher 
 ‘meritocracy ?ƐĐŽƌĞƐŵĞĂŶƐƚŚŝƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉƌŽũĞĐƚŵĂǇďĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶĚŽƵďƚ ?This may add weight 
to those authors (e.g. McRobbie 2016) seeking to account for cultural and creative labour 
through forms of individualisation associated with theories of neoliberalism. More research 
work on connecting attitudes in a range of nations beyond the UK to broader theories of 
cultural work may prove fruitful here.  
The positive reading, which is associated with the idea that people think the sector in which 
they work is fair and meritocratic, is most troubling, given the research that has revelled the 
structural and overwhelming inequalities within cultural work. As a result, we should expect 
more media attention to address questions of access, representation and consumption but 
there is little indication that these controversies will challenge the faith individual cultural 
workers have in the role that hard work and talent plays in getting in and getting on.  
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